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Upon Information
and Belief
The University of Denver Law School enters its fiftieth year this
fall in new quarters on the University campus. A portion of the Mary
Reed Library Building has been set aside for the use of the school. Instructors' offices are located on the fourth floor, class rooms on the third
and the law library has been placed in the south wing of the building.
Dr. Duncan Emrich, the University Publicity Director, confided to us
that Gordon Johnston expects to hold some of his classes out on the
lawn. Gordon would.
The bar lost two of its outstanding men with the recent deaths of
Dean Hamlet J. Barry and Congressman Edward Taylor. Ham Barry
was associated with the Westminster Law School for so long that he was
the law school, and Ed Taylor has been a member of Congress continuously since a time before many of us were born.
The July-August issue of the UTAtH BAR BULLETIN contains an
article, Competency of Witnesses in Utah to Transactions with Deceased,
Insane or Incompetent Persons,written by Justice James H. Wolfe of the
Utah Supreme Court. The fact that the article is a reprint from the
ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW RUVIEW for June, 1941, must give pardonable
satisfaction to the editorial board of the LAW REVIEW and that the article possessed sufficient merit to justify its publication in two legal periodicals must be highly gratifying to Judge Wolfe, its author.
Last morith we published a list of those of our members in the military service of the United States. Under a resolution passed by the
association, those in good standing at the time of their induction will
remain in good standing during the entire period of their service without
the payment of any further dues. To them we are sending DICTA each
month. If it is not being received on time, the tardiness is probably due
to transfers and the fact that we do not have latest addresses. So to you
boys in the army, navy and marine corps, keep us advised where you are
-- or better still, even though we have your correct address, let us know
how you are getting along.
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The Return to the
*
Constitution
By HENRY WEIHOFENIn the August issue of DICTA,t Mr. Joseph C. Sampson of the
Denver Bar, under the title, The Lawyer's Oath, issues a trumpet call
to all lawyers to oppose the New Deal in the name of the Constitution.
With the political philosophy therein expressed I do not here wish to
quarrel, but the attempt to read that philosophy into the Constitution
calls for refutation.
Mr. Sampson discusses a number of the most important constitutional cases decided during the last seven years, and disapproves of them
all. Throughout the article, the "present members of the court" are
repeatedly referred to as the main objects of reproof. But, surprisingly,
almost all the cases condemned were decided before the first Roosevelt
appointee went on the bench. When, therefore, Mr. Sampson permits
himself in the heat of argument to refer to "judicial revolutionists," be
must be taken to mean not Justices Black, Frankfurter, et at., but
Hughes, Roberts and Stone, with Hughes serving as Chief Revolutionist,
he having written the opinions in six of the ten cases condemned.
The "judicial revolution," we are told, consists of nothing less
than a discarding of stare decisis and the overruling of "150 years of
precedent."
But when we get down to cases, the new decisions complained of turn out to overrule specifically only three cases. These are
Collector v. Day,1 Hammer v. Dagenhart (the Child Labor case) 2 and
Adkins v. Children's Hospital (the Minimum Wage case),3 decided in
1871, 1918 and 1923 respectively. None of these was supported by
previous decisions; all had been long and strenuously criticized as unjustified by the provisions of the Constitution. It could more justly be
argued that it was the conservative judges who wrote the majority opinions in these cases, especially the child labor and the minimum wage
*The opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the Denver or
Colorado Bar Associations.
'Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado; Special Assistant to the
Attorney General of the United States, 1937-38; author, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN
CRIMINAL LAW (1933): (with Kenneth C. Sears) MAY'S CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed.
1938) ; articles in various law reviews. Mr. Weihofen wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Clay R. Apple of the Greeley, Colorado, Bar for many helpful suggestions and scholarly references.
1(1941) 18 DICTA 202.
'1I Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 90 (1871).
2247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 422, 62 L. ed. 939 (1918).
8261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394: 67 L. ed. 785 (1923).
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cases, who were the "judicial revolutionists," distorting the language of
the Constitution, and writing into it propositions never intended by the
Framers or suspected by anyone else. The later court in overruling these
decisions has not departed from the Constitution, but returned to it.
That the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is, is
denounced as a "new and vicious doctrine." Most lawyers, surely, have
heard this statement of Charles Evans' Hughes 4 too often to find it new,
and it would seem too inevitable a corrolary of our constitutional system
to be deemed vicious. Certainly the Constitution is and always has been
what the Supreme Court said. As construed by John Marshall, th'e
Constitution took on strength which it had not had before, and which
it would not have acquired if Spencer Roane of Virginia had been Chief
Justice in Marshall's place (as he would have been if Ellsworth had held
on to his position for one more month and Jefferson instead of Adams
had had the appointment). Under Taney, social interests acquired recognition which Marshall was willing to give only to private rights.
Under the leadership of Stephen Field, "due process," a modest clause
requiring merely a fair hearing, took on a new and surprising meaning
which made it the principal bulwark of private rights against social control, and thus effected a revolution in our constitutional law-a revolution which was checked only by the coming to the court of Holmes and
Brandeis.
The meaning of the Constitution has fluctuated in response to the
personal opinions of the judges, the influence of Presidents and the exigencies of events. The meaning of interstate commerce has had a meandering history. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted to protect negroes
against whites, has been metamorphosed into a provision protecting corporations against legislatures. Presidents have overcome adverse decisions
by appointing judges who saw eye to eye with the administration. In
emergencies, the court has upheld vast concentration of power in the
hands of the executive. And all this happened long before 1933.
This process of development, of expansion and contraction, backing and filling, the growth of one constitutional doctrine and the decline
of another-this process did not suddenly come to an end when we graduated from law school. It would be so much more neat, true enough, if
law would stay put, if rules once learned could be counted on to remain
true forever. But this wish for certainty is mere carry-over of the fathercomplex of the child mind.5
Mr. Sampson sagely states that the present court is attempting to
adapt the law and the Constitution to what it conceives to be changing
economic and social conditions. The implications are (1) that the court
is now doing this for the first time, and (2) that it shouldn't be done.
'ADDRESSES AND PAPERS (1st ed. 1908) pp. 139-140.
'See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN I41ND (193 1).
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A reading of any good constitutional history will show that the
court has not usually been so stupid as to ignore the economic and social
conditions upon which the law must operate. Constitutional law is not
a mere abstract, self-contained logic; it does not operate in a vacuum.
There is no nice distinction between legal principles and those which are
economic or sociological. You cannot determine the constitutionality
of a state sales tax on a delivery of goods sent from another state, for
example, except in the light of the economic effect upon such out-of-state
buying. Constitutional law is not divorced from life.
A reexamination of the cases will show that, with the three exceptions mentioned, they do not purport to overrule prior cases, and that
these three eminently deserved overruling.
THE MORATORIUM CASES
In 1934, in the Minnesota Moratorium case,6 the Supreme Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, upheld the Minnesota statute
designed to meet the desperate situation arising from the depression and
to minimize the losses accruing to both mortgagors and mortgagees from
the flood of foreclosures. The statute provided for limited extensions
of time for foreclosure, upon court order, during the emergency.
With this decision, says Mr. Sampson, "The court first sanctioned
the doctrine of expediency in an alleged (!) economic emergency as an
escape from constitutional limitation on legislative action."
This statement is sufficiently answered by pointing to a long line
of cases upholding emergency legislation.7
More than a hundred years ago, Chancellor Kent denounced the
Charles River Bridge decision' in language very similar to Mr. Sampson's.
The decision, he wrote, "injures the moral sense of the community and
destroys the stability of contracts * * * I have lost my confidence and
'Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78
L. ed. 413.
'The Legal Tender cases, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287 (1871); Juilliard v.
Greenman, 110 U. S.421, 4 S.Ct. 122, 28 L. ed. 204 (1884); Wilson v. New,
243 U. S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755 (1917) ; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S.
135, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1921).
"Emergency laws in time of peace are uncommon, but not unknown. Wholesale
disaster, financial panic, the aftermath of war (Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries &
W. Co., 251 U. S. 146, 161, 40 S. Ct. 106, 64 L. ed. 194). earthquake, pestilence,
famine, and fire, a combination of men or the force of circumstances may, as the alternative of confusion or chaos, demand the enactment of laws that would be thought arbitrary under normal conditions (Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16, 18, 19, 25 L. ed.
980; American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 S. Ct. 200, 55 L. ed. 82)."
People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. LaFetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16
A. L. R. 152 (1921).
For a full discussion see Clark, Emergencies and the Larw
(1934), 49 POL. Sc. Q. 268.
'Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9 L.ed. 773 (1837).
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hopes in the constitutional guardianship and protection of the Supreme
Court."9

Today, no one doubts the correctness of that decision.
We live in a society of law, not an anarchy. "Pretty much all law,"
as Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "consists in forbidding men to do some
things that they want to do, and contract is no more exempt from law
than other acts."' 1
The Minnesota Moratorium case held the Minnesota statute a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. Neither creditor nor debtor
was deprived of his property without due process. Both were protected.
Mortgagee interests have largely acceded in this view. That the decision
does not give the states carte blanche in postponing foreclosure was made
sufficiently clear a year later when the court held a somewhat broader
Arkansas statute unconstitutional."
BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST
In 1934, in Nebbia t. New York," the court, in an opinion by
"revolutionist" Mr. Justice Roberts, upheld a New York law regulating
the price of milk.
"Never before," we are told, "had the court permitted governmental regulation of prices except in the case of public utilities, which because
of their monopolistic character, were 'affected with a public interest.' "
This is incorrect. Various businesses not public utilities and not
monopolistic in character had been subjected to price control."3 The
OQuoted in WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 269.
1°Dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 568, 43 S. Ct.
394, 67 L. ed. 785 (1923), citing numerous cases. That contract rights may be
restricted by reasonable exercise of the police power is established by a host of cases:
Northwestern Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036 (1878);
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079 (1880) ; Butchers Union Slaughter
House v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 S. Ct. 652, 28 L. ed. 585 (1884);
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 S. Ct. 206, 53 L. ed. 315 (1908); Holden
v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 S. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780 (1898) : Muller v. Oregon,
208 U. S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 424, 52 L. ed. 551 (1908), Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S.
426, 37 S. Ct. 435, 61 [.. ed. 830 (1917); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183
U. S. 13, 22 S. Ct. 1, 46 L. ed. 55 (1901)-to name only a few.
"W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56. 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. ed. 1298
(1935).
See also Treigle v. Acme Homestead Assn., 297 U. S. 189, 56 S. Ct. 408,
80 L. ed. 575 (1936), holding invalid a Louisiana law, undertaking to alter the
contracts of building and loan associations.
"1291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1933).
"Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 14 S. Ct. 857, 38 L. ed. 757 (1894)
(fixing charges of grain elevators where there was no monopoly) ; German Alliance
Insurance Co. v. Lewis.. 233 U. S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 612, 58 L. ed. 1011 (1914)
(fixing fire insurance rate ) : Block v. -irsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed.
865 (1921)
(fixing rents) ; Highland v. Russell Car Zd Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S.
253, 49 S. Ct. 314, 73.L. ed. 688 (1929) (fixing price of coal during war time);
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 S. Ct. 181, 77 L. ed. 288 (1932) (fixing
rates for contract haulers as well as common carriers).
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court had, however, in previous cases, attempted to employ the concept
of a business "affected with a public interest," and to hold that only
such businesses could be subjected to price control. The term "business
affected with a public interest" had come into the law quite by accident
in 1877.14 It had no meaning then and in half a century of heroic effort
the court had not succeeded in giving it a workable definition. Nebbia
v. New York discarded the impractical phrase. Its passing gives no cause
for grief.
THE GOLD CLAUSE CASES
The Gold Clause Cases 5 are indeed subject to criticism, -but not
because they go too far; rather, because they do not go far enough. In
holding that the government may nullify the gold clauses of private
obligations, the court pointed out that the power of Congress to fix the
value of the dollar and control the currency necessarily includes power
to prevent obstruction to the free flow of that currency, and that no
private contract may be permitted to prevent the exercise of that power.
For the court to have ruled otherwise would have been to nullify the
plainly expressed power. No cases can be cited which these cases overrule; on the contrary, the precedents are all in accord with the result
reached.' 6
As to government obligations, however, the court in the gold cases
refused to follow this reasoning, though it would seem to be as valid
here as in the railroad case. If the gold obligations obstructed the free
flow of the new currency, Congress by a non-discriminatory measure
should have been allowed to include government obligations with all
others in providing for payment in the new currency. The court, however, held the opposite, with the result that while all other obligations
were now payable in the new currency, government bonds were payable
in the old. The staggering burden this would saddle upon the government apparently gave the majority of the court pause, and they held that
though the government had breached the contract, the bondholder could
not recover because he had not proved damages. The government was
branded a defaulter for failing to pay its just debts; and in the next breath
"The term was first presented to the court in argument of counsel in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1877), and casually taken over by the court.
It was supposedly based on a fragmentary statement of Lord Hale's. For the interesting
story of how this phrase was transferred from Hale's forgotten little book to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, see Walton Hamilton, Affectation
With a Public Interest, 39 YALE L. J. 1089.
"5 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U. S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407, 79
L. ed. 885 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed.
912 (1935).
"The Legal Tender Cases. 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287 (1871) : Juilliard v.
Greenman, 110 U. S. 421, 4 S. Ct. 122, 28 L. ed. 204 (1884): Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869).
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the bondholder, seeking to collect this just debt, was charged with seeking "unjust enrichment"!
This has been criticized," but not from Mr. Sampson's point of
view. Indeed, it is not clear what his point is. He speaks darkly of the
moral laxity and even moral chaos which the decision supposedly caused,
about which I happily know nothing. Be that as it may, we are not
here discussing theology or morals, but constitutional law. Constitutionally, there is no basis in precedent or in principle for denying to
Congress the power to abrogate gold clauses.
TVA
It is no doubt true that TVA represents a tremendous expansion of
government ownership and operation of industry-socialism, if you
will. Whether this is a good thing or a bad thing is debatable and
debated. But it is a question upon which we must make up our own
minds; the Framers did not settle it for us. Americans have a weakness
for assuming that any strong beliefs they may hold, whether on legal,
political, economic or even religious questions, are certainly embodied in
the Constitution, and that the opposing view is "unconstitutional."
Socialism is a Bad Thing; ergo, it is unconstitutional. The fact that all
the decisions of the Supreme Court are to the contrary' is apparently
immaterial.
Shocking as it may seem to the Mark Hanna school of politics, the
Framers did not write any particular economic philosophy into the Constitution-least of all laissez faire individualism, which was still in ovo,
and did not come into its own until, say, 1830,19 and which found no
support in the United States Supreme Court until the 1890's.
"See, for example, Dickinson, The Gold Decisions, 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 715.
IAshwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. ed. 688 (1936);
Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217, 38 S. Ct. 112, 62 L. ed. 252 (1917):
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 S. Ct. 499, 64 L. ed. 878 (1920) (upholding
North Dakota legislation providing for such enterprises as a state bank, state warehouse,
elevator, flour mill system and state home-building project) : Madera Water Works v.
Madera, 228 U. S. 454, 33 S. Ct. 571, 57 L. ed. 915 (1913); Standard Oil Co. v.
Lincoln, 275 U. S. 504, 48S. Ct. 155, 72 L. id. 395 (1926).
Taxes may be laid for "any purpose in which the state may engage and this covers
almost any private business if the Legislature thinks the state's engagement in it will
help the general public * * *." Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630, 67 L. ed. 1103 (1923).
"Itis settled by unanimous decisions of this court that the due process clause does
not prevent a state or city from engaging in the business of supplying its-inhabitants
with articles in general use, when it is believed that they cannot be secured at reasonable
prices from the private dealers." Brandeis, J., dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S.262, 52 S.Ct. 371, 76 L. ed. 747 (1932).
The Framers apparently felt that the Constitution gave the national government
power even "to establish mercantile monopolies." BRANT, STORM OVER THE CONSTITUTION, 133. That the federal government build dams at Muscle Shoals.to control the
Tennessee
River was urged more than a hundred years ago by John C. Calhoun.
"9The year of the repeal of the Corn Laws. as good an arbitrary date as any to
mark the acceptance of laissez faire economics in England.
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In the words of the Mississippi Supreme Court: "The due process
provisions of our constitutions do not enact Adam Smith's concept of
the negative state, one of the main junctions of which would be to stand
aloof from intervention in the social and econmoic life of its citizens.
This concept of the state was probably acted upon in the early history of
this country but has long since been discarded * * * ,20
The assumption that the TVA program is not really a defense
measure, to create power and manufacture nitrates, but is purely a plan
to socialize the domestic electric power business, should certainly be
silenced today, when TVA's contributions to national defense and to
navigation are indisputable. True, the generation and distribution of
electric power is also a large aspect of the program, but the very nature
of the task calls for a combination of these functions; they cannot be
separated.
That the sale of the electric power generated by the dams involves
competition with privately owned utility companies raises no constitutional issue. In spite of much wishful thinking, there is no constitutional protection to a business against competition. On the contrary,
business men themselves do much talking in favor of a competitive system. That the competition comes from a government-owned business
is immaterial. Government may compete with private industry, and
may make full use of its sovereign powers (e. g., taxation) to undersell
and ruin the private industry. The Constitution does not prevent it.21
Whether government should use this power to ruin private industry
is a question of policy to be determined at the polls. If opponents of
such government operations cannot win the electorate to their viewpoint,
they must not scold the courts for refusing to interfere. The Constitution does not empower the courts to do so.
REGULATION OF WAGES
"Until the advent of the present (sic) 'liberal court,' " we are told,
"wage-fixing by government boards, commissions and bureaus had always been held unconstitutional."
Always? Well, to be exact, from 1923 to 1937. In 1923, in
Adkins v. Children'sHospital, 22 the court by a 5-3 decision (practically
5-4) held unconstitutional a District of Columbia act providing for
minimum wages for women. There was no precedent for such a decision. Chief Justice Taft, conservative as he was, dissented, saying, "It
is not the function of this court to hold congressional acts invalid simply
'Albritton v. City of Winona (Miss.)

178 So. 799 (1938).

'Puget Sound Power Z4Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 54 S. Ct. 542, 78

L. ed. 1025 (1934).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785
(1923).
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because they are passea to carry out economic views which the court believes to be unwise and unsound."
The easy assumption that Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the
majority, spoke with the voice of the Fathers, can in this instance be
specifically disproved. The Fathers had no objection to price fixing.
Most of the original thirteen states passed laws fixing the prices of various
commodities. 23 Indeed, "due process" to the Fathers involved no sub24
stantive restrictions at all, but meant merely "process,"-procedure.
Mr. Justice Sutherland's reasoning in the Adkins case was brilliantly and mercilessly demolished by Thomas Reed Powell. I quote
only one sentence from his conclusion: "As a flagrant instance of insufficient reasons and of a judgment widely regarded as an indefensible judgment, the minimum wage decision has few, if any, rivals. ' ' 2 This was
essentially the verdict of other commentators on the decision, including
Edward S. Corwin, Edwin Borchard, C. G. Haines, and F. B. Sayre. "
When the "present liberal court" (meaning the not-so-liberal court
of 1937) overruled this judicial misfit,2 7 it was not violating the Constitution, but was healing a violation done to it by Mr. Justice Sutherland and his conservative associates.
SALARY TAX CASES
In 1939, the court held that a state may collect income tax on the
The
salary of a federal employe S-overruling Collector u. Da .25reasoning of the court was that such a tax is not a burden on the federal
government. The same reasoning applies to federal taxation of state
employes. The decision is denounced, on the ground that it "nonchalantly overrules a constitutional principle firmly established by former
decisions for a century and a half." The reply can be brief:
'As late as 1841, the city of Mobile had an ordinance fixing the price of bread.
It
This was held valid. Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 36 Am. Dec. 441 (1841).
is interesting to note that this case was quoted with approval in Munn v. Illinois, supra,
note 14. The court in the Munn case pointed out that "it has been customary in England
since time immemorial, and in this country from its colonization, to regulate ferries,
common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, warfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing
to fix a maximum of charge to be made for the services rendered, accommodations furnished,
and articles sold."
24
For references to some of the immense literature on this change of meaning of
"due process," see Comm-ager, Constitutional History and the Higher Law, in THE
CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERFD,'225 at 231.
'Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HARV. L.
REV. 545.
'Articles by these and other writers are collected in a booklet entitled THE SUPREME COURT AND MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION (1925) compiled by the National
Consumers League.
'West Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578, 81 L. ed. 703
(1937).
'Graves v. New York ex tel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed.
927, 120 A. L. R. 1466 (1939).
'11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1871).
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1. This seems to carry the reverence for precedent to the ultimate
or bad, a precedent must never be overruled.
2. That the court adopted the new rule "nonchalantly" is belied
by the cautious progress of the decisions. a°
The "century and a half" of precedent dates from 1871.
3.
There was no basis for Collector v. Day in prior decisions.
Collector v. Day rested on the ground that an income tax on the
salary of a government employe is a tax on that government. The
O'Keefe case, overruling this, holds that the likelihood of the burden
of such a tax being passed on to the employer-government is too remote.
As a state employe, I can ruefully testify to the correctness of the newer
rule. My federal income tax comes out of my pocket; I have not found
a way to load the burden on the State of Colorado. The present rule is
all too correct. I know.

-good

THE SALES AND USE TAX CASES
Very important cases in this field have been decided in the last few
years. 3 1 They involve economic and legal considerations too complex
to discuss in this cursory article. In general, the justification for permitting states in some instance to tax sales of goods brought in from
other states is to prevent discrimination against local sales. It is not yet
clear how far the states may go in applying such taxes. The court in the
Berwind-White case felt that it was not overruling prior cases, though
admitting that prior dicta were contra. I am inclined to agree with Mr.
Sampson; it is difficult to reconcile the case with some prior decisions.
But this does not mean the case is wrong. The court had already
held that a compensating use tax could be applied to such sales.3 2 To
deny that the same objective can be accomplished by a sales tax would
involve a mere technicality of draftsmanship, rather than any great constitutional principle.
The applicability of modern sales taxes to interstate sales involves
new and complex problems. It is naive to assume that the answers can
'The evolution of the new rule can be traced through James v. Dravo Construction Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. ed. 155 (1937) ; Silas Mason Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186, 58 S. Ct. 233, 82 L. ed. 287 (1937); Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U. S. 362, 58 S. Ct. 616, 82 L. ed. 897 (1938); Helveringv. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405,58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. 1427 (1938).
"Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524, 81 L. ed. 814
(1937) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 60 S. Ct.
388, 84 L. ed. 565 (1940) : Nelion v. Sears, Roebuck t Co., 312 U. S. 359, 61
S. Ct. 586, 85 L. ed. 622 (1941) and others. Of the many articles discussing the
subject, see, among the latest: McNamara, Jurisdictionaland Interstate Commerce Problems in the Imposition of Excises on Sales (1941) 8 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 482; Vaske, Are You Selling in Foreign States?
467.
12Henneford
v. Silas Mason Co., supra, note 31.

(Aug., 1941)

19 TAXES
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be found by merely reading the Constitution. The answers must be
worked out with only the broadest constitutional principles to guide the
court. Probably any solution can be supported by appeal to precedents
-and criticised by appeal to other precedents.
NLRB CASES
The line of cases involving the Labor Relations Act has, undoubtedly, extended the concept of interstate commerce further than had previously been conceived. But to say that these cases ignore well established precedents, and that by holding the plants of the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation to be in the stream of interstate commerce 3 the
court "completely upset a long line of precedents, firmly established,"
is error. Erroneous also is the further statement that "prior to the National Labor Relations Board cases, the court had not permitted the
federal government to intrude at all in commerce conducted wholly
within state borders." Any law student could challenge these statements
by pointing to the famous Shreveport rate case 8 4 which permitted federal regulation of rates of a railroad line lying wholly within the State
of Texas, on the ground that that line competed with an interstate line
and regulation of the intrastate line was necessary for effective regulation
of the interstate. The board of trade and stockyard cases3 5 had permitted
federal regulation of activities no less local than the steel industry on the
ground that they were part of the "stream of commerce."
These concepts are not new. Perhaps the most important single
purpose leading to the adoption of the Constitution was the creation of
a federal government with power to control interstate commerce and
prevent state barriers. True, the Framers did not think of the village
blacksmith as being engaged in interstate commerce, but they emphatically did intend to give Congress control of "that commerce that concerns more states than one,"- 3" and if the steel industry today is not a
merely local activity conducted under the spreading chestnut tree, but is
'NLRB v. Jones !& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81
L. ed. 893 (1937).
In accord: Railroad
"'234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed. 1341 (1913).
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. F- Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 48 S. Ct. 232,
66 L. ed. 371 (1922); Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456,
44. S. Ct. 169, 68 L. ed. 388 (1924).

'Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 S.Ct. 397, 66 L. ed. 735 (1922)
Tagg Bros. Z4Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S.420, 50 S.Ct. 220, 74 L. ed.
524 (1930) ;Chicago Board of Trade v. Olson, 262 U. S.1,43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L.
ed. 829 (1923).
"'The words 'among the several states' distinguish between the commerce which
concerns more states than one and that commerce which is confined within one state and
does not affect other states." Hughes, J., in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
The italicized phrase
398, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. ed. 1511 (1913) (italics added).
w-as first used by Marshall, C. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-5, 6 L. ed.

23 (1824).
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a great giant extending its ramifications beyond state lines, it is subject
to federal regulation within the clear intent of the Constitution.
"We must bear in mind," said Alexander Hamilton, "that we are
not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward to
remote futurity * * * Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious, than
to infer the extent of any power proper to be lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to
be a capacity to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen;
and as these are illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible to limit
3
that capacity."- 7
The prophetic words of Madison are also in point here: "If," he
said, "the people should in future become more partial to the federal than
to the state governments, the change can only result from such manifest
andIirresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all
their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not
surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they
may discover it to be most due." 38
THE AAA
The court in Mulford v. Smith 39 upheld the second AAA (1938),
in fixing marketing quotas for tobacco. Mr. Sampson indicates his disapproval of the case, but his objections are addressed solely to the wisdom
of the act. Constitutionally, no reason is pointed out why the court
ought to have stricken the act down.
Careful analysis of the case would have revealed an argument, however. The result of the case is impossible to square with Hammer v.
Dagenhart,"4 the famous child labor decision of 19 18. There the court
held that Congress could not prevent the interstate shipment of childmade goods, on the novel ground that the power to control interstate
commerce did not give Congress power to prevent interstate transportation in order to reach evils occurring before the transportation (although
it could do so to prevent evils occurring after transportation, as in the
Mann Act). The AAA of 1938 prevented the interstate marketing of
tobacco grown in excess of quota-a prior evil. The court upheld the
AAA and gave Hammer v.Dagenhart the silent treatment. This indicated to students of constitutional law that Hammer v. Dagenhart was
3 THE FEDERALIST,

No. XXXIV.

'STHE FEDERALIST, No. XLVI.

1307 U. S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. ed. 1092 (1939).
40247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918).
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on the way out, and they were not surprised when, in 1941, in sustaining the Wage and Hour law, the court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart
41
expressly.
Why Mr. Sampson neglects the Wage and Hour decision-one of
the few important cases in which the present court has actually overruled
an important precedent--I don't know. 4 2 We can take it that he disapproves. But Hammer L. Dagenhart was certainly wrong, 43 and the
present court in overruling it was right.
CONCLUSION
Some of the cases criticized in the August DICTA involve no new
law, overrule no prior cases, e. g., the TVA and Gold Clause cases. In
those the objection seems to be, not that the court has overthrown precedent, but that it has not. When the new decision is disliked, the court
is scolded for overruling precedent, but when the old law is disliked, the
court is criticized for following precedent.
Other decisions criticized involve the perpetual process of extension
or redefinition of constitutional doctrine. They do not involve the
overthrow of precedent, but merely illustrate that the interpretation of
the broad language of the Constitution must be "adjusted to the various
crises of human affairs." The cases specifically overruled consist mainly
of two decisions of the ultra-conservative court of the previous generation, decisions wholly impossible to justify under the language of the
Constitution. The court in recent years has restored in large measure
the separation of the powers of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches which the court during the preceding half century had gradually been usurping unto itself. It was the trend of decisions from
1890 to 1937 which did violence to the Constitution. In reversing that
trend, the court has not deserted the Constitution but has returned to it.
"United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. ed.

395 (1941).

"Also neglected, for some reason, is Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,
58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1937), overruling the hundred-year-old case of Swift
v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1842).
In Swift v. Tyson the court had
usurped for the federal courts the power to declare their own common law, "a power
not conferred by the Constitution, and in so doing (had) invaded rights reserved by
the Constitution to the several states."
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY, 273.
'5 For criticisms of the case see Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case (1918) 32
HARV. L. REV. 45; Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the
Commerce Clause (1918) 3 So. L. Q. (now TULANE L. REV.) 175.
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National Defense and Reforms in Procedure and
Judicial Selection Are Chief Topics Before
State Bar Meeting
"America is next on call" was the theme stressed by all of the
speakers appearing before the forty-fourth annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association, held at Colorado Springs on September 12 and 13.
Associate Justice Hugo L. Black of the United States Supreme Court,
Hatton W. Sumners, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House
of Representatives, and Judge Florence E. Allen, Justice of the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, urged the Bar to assume the task of seeing that
Hitlerian philosophy in America be destroyed and that the youth of this
nation be actively taught the American creed.
Not all of the program was devoted to national defense. With a
registration substantially in excess of previous years, the convention
tackled the serious business of outlining a program for judicial selection,
the framing of a new code for probate procedure and a new code for
water administration law. For the first time the newly created sections
for the district attorneys and county judges met with the state Bar, and
the recently organized district judges' conference met the day prior to the
Bar convention.
At the conclusion of the annual convention, W. W. Platt of Alamosa became the forty-fifth president of the Colorado Bar Association.
Edward L; Wood of Denver was chosen president-elect, and Sperry S.
Packard of Pueblo senior vice-president. Other vice-presidents elected
were Clay R. Apple of Greeley, Philip S. Van Cise of Denver, and
Eugene S. Mast of Grand Junction.
Mr. Sumner, speaking before the banquet Saturday night and to a
radio audience of the National Broadcasting Company, declared that
"America is next on call and we are playing on the job. America is
walking step by step in the footprints of France. We have a peculiar
notion that we have a special dispensation to escape fate. We seek profits
out of the emergency and necessity of our country. Our people are
making merchandise out of the present situation. The Bar of this country must make our people realize these facts. \Ve are coming closer and
closer to actual war. Where is our common sense? Will we be too late?
"These are times when we hear the crashes of democracies all over
the world. The one hope of this time is the determination under God
that this shall be the spot where people retain the right to be free. But
this nation must be regenerated. We have been on a strike governmentally for twenty-five years, and we are now just getting back on the job.
We must eliminate lines of political, sectional and racial cleavage. No
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people who have opportunity to govern, themselves ever lost their freedom until they could not govern themselves. When people cannot
govern themselves, a dictator appears. The government is resident in
the people. The Constitution and the laws are not written in a book;
they are written in the spirit of men.
"Lawyers have a great opportunity. They should actively fight
for America. They should destroy bureaucracy before it destroys democracy. They should defeat this present tendency to straddle our children
with useless debt because they haven't got a vote. They should see that
the states are preserved and that the concentration of the government at
Washington-a concentration so vast that it is impossible for the government to execute its powers-is broken up and the powers returned to
the states."
Addressing one of the largest groups ever to attend the annual address delivered at the state Bar convention, Associate Justice Black on
Friday evening stated that never before have "lawyers had a higher duty
than they now have to help this nation keep faith so that the 'Government by the people, for the people, and of the people shall not perish
from this earth'.
"The habits of Democracy are hard to acquire, harder to preserve,
and I fear, easier to lose," he stated to an enthusiastic audience who rose
and cheered his address at its conclusion. "The lure of Hitlerian accomplishments and power has made other people prey to his philosophy.
To guard against the same peril, we must deepen our convictions and
rebuild our faith in democracy. Far more important than the mere
mechanics of government is its spirit. The American Bar is faced with
a tremendous task, but it wields a vast power, far greater than its numerical strength. It must speak with that power by making it of itself a
country-wide faculty, dedicated to teaching the nation the American
philosophy for a fuller enjoyment of life."
Justice Florence E. Allen, Judge of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, reiterated this same philosophy again on Saturday evening in stating that the roembers of the Bar must teach their friends and their
children of the great values in this democracy; that we must all instill in
the coming generation an appreciation of the things that are American;
that we must dramatize the things for which America stands in order
that the next generation may be more vividly aware of our priceless
heritage.
The convention reached the highest peak in attendance in the history of the state association. More than 400 lawyers were registered at
the convention desk, and it was estimated that approximately 250 wives
and daughters also attended some of the functions of the convention.
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Commencing Friday morning the convention dispatched the business connected with the report of the various officials and of the standing
and special committees.
Among the outstanding reports was that of the Committee on
National Defense, which dealt extensively with the problems created by
the national defense activities in this state and the work of the committee
in preserving and protecting the rights of those engaged in such activities.
The Committee on Law Libraries and Law Publications urged the
establishment of county law libraries and reported that efforts were being
made to reduce the cost to lawyers of the annual supplements to the
Annotated Statutes.
Fourteen separate complaints were handled by the Grievance Committee, resulting in one proceeding for disbarment, according to the report
of that committee.
The Committee on Uniform State Laws and Legislation was authorized by the convention to select such uniform state laws as they
might see fit for presentation to the state legislature for enactment into
law.
The Committee on Economic Survey announced a preliminary report pertaining to the activities of the Bar association and urged members who had not previously filled out the questionnaire to do so at once
as it was felt desirable to have at least 200 more questionnaires returned
before the committee undertook to finally tabulate the results of the
questionnaire.
President William E. Hutton, on Friday afternoon, delivered an
interesting and comprehensive report upon the status and activities of the
association, urging lawyers to take a more vigorous part in the activities
of the state association and the affairs of their community and nation.
"It is clear," he said, "that in these turbulent and unpredictable
times a special responsibility attaches to the legal profession. The lawyer
has been given privileges above other men because of his assumed training, interest and qualifications. It follows that he is under a greater
responsibility in respect to all matters that relate to law and government.
He is under greater responsibility to see that wrongs are prevented or
righted, that justice is done, that law is respected, and when called for,
changed or bettered. Articulate leadership is a fit, and should be a natural, role of the qualified lawyer.
"Democracy cannot maintain its institutions, its freedom, its justice,
its opportunity for the future, unless there be a general, practically universal effort, willingness to serve, desire for knowledge, determination to
grapple with and deal with the difficult problems that confront humanity. Lawyers must lead democracy in its struggles toward better life,
toward permanency of its institutions."
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The remainder of the Friday afternoon session was devoted to a
symposium of federal administration and practice, with papers being
read by Harry Silverstein, Sr., of Denver, David P. Strickler of Colorado
Springs, and Albert L. Vogl of Denver.
Saturday morning was devoted to various section meetings, and
similar activities. The Committee on Probate Revision, in conjunction
with the County Judges Association, discussed changes in probate law
and revisions, and also worked on a code to be submitted to the state
legislature for action.
The Section on Water Rights studied a proposal for an entire water
code and decided to devote their energies toward a code for water administration and work on the details of a substantive water law at a latei
date.
The Junior Bar Conference also met on Saturday morning, and
adopted an amendment to its by-laws, approved by the Board of Governors, constituting the Conference a section of the Colorado Bar Association, rather than a part of the American Bar Association. Ray Moses
of Alamosa was elected chairman, Edward Ruff of Denver, vice-chairman, Leo S. Altman of Pueblo, secretary, and Wm. Rhodes of Greeley,
H. Shields Mason of Denver, Nicholas Dazzo of Trinidad, and Charles
F. Stewart of Gunnison were chosen councilmen from the four congressional districts.
At the noon session on Saturday the convention unanimously requested the Board of Governors to continue the Committee on Judicial
Selection and authorized it to enter into conferences with various elements of the state such as women's groups, labor organizations, professional and commercial clubs and the press so that as a result of this united
effort, an amendment could be submitted to the electorate providing in
substance for the plan of judicial selection set forth in detail in the Loose
Leaf Service.
Declaring that the elective method of judicial selection has not met
the test of experience, John Perry Wood, chairman of the American Bar
Association Committee on Judicial Selection and Tenure, pointed out
that "judges whose tenure is assured are removed from all temptation to
color their judgments according to their personal interest. Their position is assured so long as they are capable and do justice honestly. It is
such judges who have developed the law soundly and progressively. It
is the other sort, those whose eyes are on the next election and who, therefore, are subject to the urge of self-interest, who have rendered the backward-looking decisions." He pointed out that it was necessary to remove
the appointment of judges from the pressure of political machines and
the corrupt influences that surround"the elective practices. Plans to make
the change to the system proposed in Colorado, and now effective in Cali-
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fornia and Missouri, will bring about the opposition of those having
self-interest or narrowness of vision. He stressed the fact that it was
necessary to obtain the advice and aid of every element in the country in
the formation of the plan and the effort to accomplish that administration in order to be successful in securing an independent judiciary. "The
safeguard of a free people," he declared, "and the power of the Bar, freely
and effectively to serve the law is the independence, learning and integrity
of their judges."
After the luncheon on Saturday noon, a mock trial presentation of
important questions arising in a damage suit was given. Technical points
involving the application of the new rules of civil procedure were illustrated and enough humor was injected into the trial to rid it from any
charge of its being dry and uninteresting. G. Dexter Blount served as
trial judge and A. X. Erickson and Harry S. Silverstein, Jr., were counsel
for the plaintiff and W. A. Alexander and Allen Phipps, all of Denver,
were counsel for the defendant.
On Saturday afternoon unanimous leave was obtained from the
convention to make two important changes in the by-laws. The first
change amended Section 29 of the by-laws so that it is no longer necessary for the association to report the proceedings in full nor to send
copies of the full report to members and exchanges. The provisions
pertaining to membership were also amended by adding a provision providing for designation of such members of the association as sustaining
members as shall make such special contributions to the treasurer of the
association as may be fixed by the Board to entitle the contributor to this
designation.
The efficient and able services of Arch H. White, for so many years
Clerk of the Supreme Court of this state, were memorialized in a resolu-tion passed by the convention.
At the conclusion of the business meeting of the association a cocktail party was given by the Broadmoor Hotel.
A special program was planned for the ladies under the guidance of
Mrs. Roy Foard of Colorado Springs and members of that committee.
The El Paso Bar Association was host to the ladies attending the convention at a luncheon on Saturday noon.
Announcement was mate at the meeting by Treasurer Edward C.
King of an anonymous gift of $500.00 in cash. This sum is to be used
in furthering the work of the association.
The Law Club of Denver presented a program on Friday noon
which was one of the highlights of the convention, It was a satirical
treatment of a law institute to end all law institutes and had as its subject
"Some Aspects of Judicial Selection." Members attending the coanvention will chuckle for some time over the "fish bowl" and "loop-hole"

DICTA

273

plans of judicial selection and the theory of Professor Pushkin to dimmate all judges.
Honorary membership in the association was voted by the Board
of Governors to Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice Florence E. Allen.
Preceding the convention, the Colorado district judges met on
Thursday to discuss the problems of the district courts. Judge Stanley
H. Johnson of Denver presided at the meeting, which was devoted largely
to a discussion of pre-trial conferences under the new rules. Judge J.
Foster Symes of the United States District Court spoke upon the pretrial conference and explained its functioning in the federal courts.

MORE OR LESS PERSONAL
Various local Bar associations throughout the state held annual
meetings during the past month to select new officers for the forthcoming
fiscal year. The Northwestern Bar Association chose Allyn Cole of Glenwood Springs, president: Fred Videon of Craig, first vice-president; Percy
Rigby of Meeker, second vice-president, and Sadie H. Korn of Glenwood
Springs, secretary-treasurer. Fred B. Emigh of Durango was selected
president of the Southwestern Colorado Bar Association. Other officers
elected were Dan Milenski of Cortez, vice-president, and W. Bruce
Jacobson of Durango, secretary.
The Southeastern Colorado Bar Association elected Alfred A. Arraj
of Springfield, president; Willard J. Allen of Las Animas, vice-president,
and Charles A. Petrie of Eads, secretary-treasurer.

Charles J. Beise recently took a position with the United States
Reclamation Bureau. He and his family are now residing in Salt Lake
City. Chuck attended the state Bar convention in Colorado Springs.
He likes his work and says that as a sideline he has been doing a little
writing for the sportsmen's magazines and of course taking a few
pictures.
At a meeting of the Southwestern Colorado Bar Association held
on September eighth, George W. Lane delivered an address on the Colorado mechanic's lien laws. Following his address, the members discussed
the problems arising under this law.

Validity of

the Colorado
Assignment Act
By GRAHAM SUSMAN*
The recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of
McKelvey v. Striker, has again given rise to a discussion of the validity
of the Colorado Assignment Act. The court held that a common-law
assignment made to a trustee for the benefit of creditors was void as to
any objecting creditor. Although upholding the right to make a common-law assignment,2 the court held that a judgment creditor, who had
never accepted the offer of the debtor, had a right to pursue any remedy
which he had against the debtor or his property, "just as though no
assignment had been made."
The particular portion of the decision with which we are concerned
in this dictum contained in the opinion:
"Had the debtor proceeded under the statutory assignment act,
the results might have been different."
It will be observed that the court does not definitely say that the
results would have been different, but the implication is present.
While there is no Colorado Supreme Court decision on the exact
point involved, it has been generally felt among lawyers that the statutory assignment act is inoperative, and for that reason the statute has not
been generally invoked. 3 The particular statute now on the books 4 was
adopted in Colorado in 1897, although it was not the first assignment
act in this state. It provides generally for the assignment of debtor's
property to an assignee, who liquidates the same and makes distribution
of the proceeds to creditors. The procedure is somewhat detailed and is
similar to that followed in the federal bankruptcy courts. Section 44 of
the act provides that any person who makes such an assignment "may be
dischargedfrom his debts of every character" by compliance with the act.
This order of discharge becomes binding upon all creditors residing
*Of the Denver Bar.
'Case No. 14832, decided Aug. 25, 1941, and not yet officially reported.
2
Dasnaskus v. McCarty-Johnson Heating Co., 88 Colo. 279, 295 Pac. 490
(1931).
McMullin v. Keough-Doyle Meat Co., 96 Colo. 298, 42 P. (2d) 463

(1935).
'Denver District Court judges have declared the statute suspended. For opinions,
see the cases of In re Paul H. Little, No. 90279; Weisen v. White, No. 93432; and
In re H. W. Bullock, No. A29312.
'COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 12.
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within the state and all outside creditors who have appeared and participated in the proceedings or who have received and accepted a dividend.
This section makes it a bankruptcy act. Our court stated in the
case of Clark v. Bright:'
"The assignment act is, in effect, a bankruptcy act. It was
passed by our legislature a short time before the congressional act
and its purpose is to enable an insolvent debtor by conveying his
property to an assignee for the benefit of creditors, to be discharged
from his debts. * * * The general scope and purpose of our law is
to dischargea debtor from his debts upon complying with the law."
(Italics ours.)
The Constitution of the United States6 gives Congress the power to
establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the
United States. Under this power, Congress has acted four times. 7 The
law now in effect was enacted July 1, 1898, and with some amendments
is the one now in force. This act, of course, provides for the discharge
of the provable debts of the debtor.
We now have a situation in Colorado wherein there are two bankruptcy statutes in force, the federal and state. As already pointed out,
the state statute has been declared by our court to be a bankruptcy act,8
and has been in effect since 1897; the federal statute since 1898. It is
generally held that when Congress has power to legislate upon a subject,
but fails to do so, the individual states may so legislate. But when Congress has spoken, the question arises whether the state act thereby becomes
void, or is suspended, or held in abeyance, or whether both may act
concurrently on the same subject-matter."
In the decisions and among the text-writers, a marked distinction is
made between state statutes which are general insolvency statutes, which
provide for the discharge of the debtor and are therefore, in effect, bankruptcy statutes, and those which merely permit and regulate general
assignments for the benefit of creditors. Our statute is of the former type.
The earlier decisions held that the assignment of a debtor under the
30 Colo. 199, 69 Pac. 506 (1902).
IV, §8.
'The first act was passed April 4, 1800, and repealed Dec. 19, 1803. It made no
provision for voluntary bankruptcy and was applicable only to merchants, traders and
bankers. The second law was enacted Aug. 19, 1841, due to the panic of 1837, and
was repealed March 3, 1843. This act provided for both voluntary and involuntary
bankruptcy and was broader in its provisions than the act of 1800. The third act was
passed March 2, 1867, and repealed Sept. 1, 1878. The law now in force was enacted
July 1, 1898, and was amended in some particulars by several supplementary acts
(1903, 1906, 1910, and 1938).
8
Clark v. Bright, supra, note 5.
'See Routt County v. Denver t4 S. L. R. R. Cq,,, 88 Colo. 14, 291 Pac. 1020
(1930).

'ART.
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state act was merely an act of bankruptcy which would give creditors a
right to file an involuntary petition in bankruptcy. Other cases held
that the state act was not suspended or superseded unless the federal statute was invoked either by a voluntary or involuntary petition in bankruptcy. Typical of such decisions is that of Jensern-King-Bird Co. v.
Williams, 0 a Washington case, in which the state statute was likewise
adopted prior to 1898. The court said:
"So that it will be seen that the vital question to be determined
in this case is whether or not the bankruptcy law which was passed
by Congress * * * supersedes or suspends the state insolvency law
which was in existence at the time of the passage of said bankruptcy
act. There is some conflict of judicial decisions on this question,
but it was decided by this court * * * that the enactment of the
Federal Bankruptcy law of July 1, 1898, did not suspend the jurisdiction of state courts in insolvency cases, where there had beer no
proceeding instituted respecting the matter in controversy." (Italics
ours.)

In Shaw v. Standard Piano Company," counsel argued that since
both laws operate upon the same subject-matter, namely, the assets of the
corporation, and the same persons, namely, the corporation and its
creditors, and upon the same rights, namely, the pro-rata distribution
of assets among its creditors, the effect is that the state insolvency laws
are suspended. The court said that undoubtedly this would be true if it
had appeared that the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court had
been invoked, but since it appears that it was not, the question argued is
not presented for decision.
These earlier decisions are no longer being followed, and the courts
now hold that the state insolvency statutes are superseded whether the
federal bankruptcy statutes are invoked or not. In the Idaho case of
Capital Lumber Co. v. Saunders,12 the court points out the distinction
between proceedings under a general insolvency statute and one that
simply permits the assignment for the benefit of creditors. The decision
cites that of In re Seivers,13 in which the contention hinged upon the
question as to whether the national bankruptcy law suspended the voluntary assignment statutes of the state, and on this point the court said:
"Concerning these different contentions, it appears to me that
there is a substantial difference between a proceeding under a general insolvency statute and one under a statute permitting general
assignments. The one administers upon the estate of an insolvent
as a proceeding in the Courts, derives its potency from the law,
135 Wash. 161, 76 Pac. 934 (1904).

'87 N. J. Eq. 350, 100Adl. 167 (1916).
1226 Idaho 408, 143 Pac. 1178 (1914).
"91 Fed. 366 (D.C.Mo.E. D. 1899).
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winds up the estate judicially, and discharges the debtor. Such is
essentially a proceeding in bankruptcy, and such is undoubtedly
superseded by the act of Congress in question. * * * It results from
these views that, while proceedings under the insolvency laws, as
such, are now void whether proceedings in bankruptcy follow or
not, proceedings under the general assignment laws * * * or under
the common law deed of assignment, are not void or voidable, unless proceedings in bankruptcy are subsequently instituted." (Italics ours.)
In the leading case of In re Tarnowski,1 4 the discharge provisions
of the act were held to be severable, and the entire act was not suspended.
Tarnowski made a voluntary assignment under a state statute.similar to
the Colorado act for the benefit of creditors, and thereafter the estate was
administered according to the act and distribution made. The International Shoe Company filed its claim and received and accepted pro-rata
dividends. In due course, Tarnowski made application for a discharge
and the shoe company objected on the ground that the provision relating
to a discharge had been superseded by the National Bankruptcy Act.
The attorneys for the debtor argued that the shoe company, having
acquiesced in the proceedings, and having filed a claim and participated
in the dividends, is not in a position to object to a discharge because they
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court; that they may not enjoy the
benefits and privileges of the law and then escape its burdens by attacking
its validity. The court pointed out that the shoe company is not attacking any feature of the law under which the estate was administered, as up
to this point the statute is merely a regulation of voluntary assignment;
that anyone can assign his property to anyone else for any legitimate
purpose, and that the statute merely points out how distribution and
liquidation should be made. But the discharge of a debtor is quite
another thing. "The discharge of a bankrupt from his debts constitutes
the very essence of a bankrupt law." Since the discharge provision has
been superseded by the Bankruptcy Act, it has no force, and the creditor
may object to the discharge even though he filed his claim and accepted
the dividend.
The United States Supreme Court had this question before it in
1929 in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,15 in which the
question arose under the state act, although the federal bankruptcy act
had not been invoked. The court held the state act void, saying:
"Congress did not intend to give insolvent debtors seeking
discharge, or their creditors seeking to collect claims, choice between
"191 Wis. 279, 210 N. W. 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (1926).
15278 U. S. 261, 49 S. Ct. 108, 73 L. ed. 318 (1929).

108 U. S. 379, 2 S. Ct. 765, 27 L. ed. 760 (1883).

See also Boese v. King,
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the relief provided by the Bankruptcy Act and that specified in
state insolvency laws. States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or complement the bankruptcy act or to provide additionalor auxiliary regulations." (Italics ours.)

In view of the above decision of the United States Supreme Court,
the question has arisen whether the state statutes which do not provide
for a discharge are likewise superseded. Such a case arose in 1932, Hammond v. Lyon Realty Company.1- The court discusses at some length
the decision in InternationalShoe Co. v. Pinkus, supra, and other cases,
and then says:
"It was not decided in either of these cases that there might
not be a state insolvent law that would be superseded by the National Bankruptcy Act, although not providing for the discharge
of the indebtedness. * * * Thus it was expressly said in International Shoe Co. vs. Pinkus: 'States may not pass or enforce laws to
interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide
additional or auxiliary regulations.' It follows that not only those
state laws which purport to cover the whole field of insolvency administration are superseded by the national bankruptcy law, but all
other state laws to the extent that they hamper or restrict its proper
operation."
(Italics ours.)
The evolution of the judicial process continued until it finally
reached the point where all state statutes on the subject seem to be suspended whether or not they provide for the discharge of the debtor. This
was decided in our own circuit by Judge Phillips in the case of First
National Bank of Albuquerque v. Robinson.1 7 The case arose under a
New Mexico statute which simply provided for an assignment for benefit
of creditors, but which did not provide for a discharge of the debtor.
The court analyzed the state law and reached the conclusion that it is
essentially an insolvency act and covers substantially the same field as the
National Bankruptcy Act. While the New Mexico act does not make
express provision for the discharge of the debtor, it does provide for the
distribution of its assets and the dissolution of the corporation. * * *
The court then makes a statement which clearly goes much further than
any previous decision on the subject, when it said:
"An express provision for a discharge is not an essential element of an insolvency law." (Italics ours.)
The court then lays down this rule, which seems to go the limit
in so far as state statutes are concerned:
1-59 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
107 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
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"By virtue of the constitutional authority of Congress to
enact a uniform system of bankruptcy, the national bankruptcy
act is paramount and superior to all state laws upon the subject,
and all state insolvency laws are suspended in so far as they relate
to the same subject-matter and affect the same persons as the National Bankruptcy Act."
(Italics ours.)
This same principle has been applied and invoked on subjects other
than bankruptcy."' In 1939, Pennsylvania passed an Alien Registration
Act requiring all aliens to register each year, carry their cards with them
at all times and so on and provided a penalty for failure to comply with
the act. In 1940, Congress passed a Federal Registration Act for aliens.
A test case was brought to determine the validity of the state act. In a
well reasoned and well written opinion by Justice Hugo Black, the court
pointed out that the basic subject of the state and federal laws is identical
-registration of aliens as a distinct group; and that "the only question
is whether the state act is in abeyance or whether the state and federal
government have concurrent jurisdiction to register aliens * * *."
The court holds, first, that the Constitution of the United States
is the supreme law of the land; that the Constitution gives Congress the
power to regulate foreign affairs, and that the responsibility of a government toward an alien is part of that duty and power. "Consequently,"
said the court, "the regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of national government that where it acts,
and the state also acts on the same subject, 'the act of Congress * * * is
supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of pow.ers not controverted, must yield to it.' " (Italics ours.)
The court
then lays down the following rule:
"And where the federal government, in the exercise of its
superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of
regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration
of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress,
conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or
enforce additional or auxiliary regulations."
The decision of InternationalShoe Co. v. Pinhus, supra, is cited in
support of this statement.
It would appear that if the words "administration of the estates of
bankrupts" were substituted in the above quotation for the words "registration of aliens," we would thereby have what is probably the present
law upon the subject in this country.
There are some courts which cannot understand why the state laws
'Hines v. Davidowitz, 61 S. Ct. 399 (decided Jan. 20, 1941).
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cannot be enforced or proceeded under so long as the federal bankruptcy
law is not invoked. The answer is that Congress has the power to legislate upon the subject matter of bankruptcies. It has not always done
so. 19 During such periods, when no federal act was in force, state acts
upon the subject were perfectly valid. It is not the right of Congress to
establish these laws, but their actual establishment, which causes the state
statutes to become inoperative.2 ° The proposition, therefore, that the
state act is suspended or held in abeyance by the federal act is as clear upon
authority as it'is upon logic.
In the McKelvy case2' the Colorado Assignment Act itself was not
involved, much less its validity, since that case involved only a common
law assignment.

Therefore the language of the court that "the results

might have been different" if the debtor had proceeded under the statutory assignment was pure dictum and cannot be taken as indicating in any

way that in a case directly involving the validity of the state act, our
Supreme Court would not follow the general line of authorities.

Hamlet J. Barry, Jr., Writes of

Current Events of
Bench and Bar
Greater Number of Government Vehicles Boosts Tort Claims
Since the defense effort has been under way there has been a twenty
per cent increase in tort claims involving government-owned vehicles.
Because of all these claims it is predicted that the pending tort claim bill
will be speedily passed. This bill provides that claims for $7,500 or less
will be adjudicated in the federal courts. Claims of a greater amount
will still have to be considered by the congressional claims committees.
Lawyers Are Urged to Learn Latin-American Laws

Roy Vallance, secretary general of the Inter-American Bar Association, in a recent address recommended that lawyers and law students
familiarize themselves with the legal institutions of the Pan-American
countries. Mr. Vallance also suggested that attempts should be made to
harmonize and unify the commercial law of the Americas, and that unless
the lawyers make this effort the increasing trade with South America will
be hampered in its growth.
'"Supra, note 7.
'Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529 (1819).
'Supra, note 1.
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Making Employes Turn Over Tips Held Fraud on Public
Recently in San Diego an employer who required his employes to
turn their tips over to him was scored by the municipal judge. The
judge said that such a practice was a fraud on the public in that such a
system plays on the generous impulses of the public to reward underpaid
waitresses.
Chances Are Open in Border Patrol for Young Lawyers
Young men with legal educations are qualified for positions with
the United States Border Patrol. Last summer Congress ordered the
patrol to increase its membership' by 712, and presently many of these
jobs are going begging for lack of qualified applicants.
Use of Word "Court" in Titles of Radio Programsto Stop
The National Association of Broadcasters has agreed to follow the
recommendations of the American Bar Association by eliminating the
word "court" from titles of radio programs. The broadcasters have also
agreed not to offer legal advice over the air, nor to lead the radio public
to believe that radio programs are any part of the judicial system. The
Bar association's position is that the practice in the past has been such as
to mislead the public to believe that the proceedings of an actual court
trial are being broadcast.
Law Book PublishersDeny Charges of Trade Commission
Answers have been filed by thirty-two law book publishers to a
complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission. This complaint
charged the publishers with having formed a combination to suppress
competition by price fixing.
The answers admit the organization and operation of the American
Association of Law Book Publishers, but aver that the purpose of the
association was never to suppress, hinder or lessen competition among
its members.

Motion Days Changed During Jury Term
During the present jury term, motions in the civil divisions of the
Denver District Courts will be heard on Saturdays instead of on Mondays, as has been the previous practice. The change has been made so
that jury trials may proceed without interruption from Monday through
Friday of each week. During the same period, and as a matter of convenience to members of the Bar, Presiding Judge Henry S. Lindsley and
Judge Henry A. Hicks have arranged to hear pleadings, motions and
arraignments in the criminal divisions on Mondays of each week.
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